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Institutional Environment, Public-Private Hybrid Forms, and Entrepreneurial 
Reinvestment in a Transition Economy 
 
Abstract 
Many less developed and, especially, transition economies have had high levels of 
entrepreneurial reinvestment for relatively long periods despite the absence of developed 
government institutions. To resolve this puzzle, this study proposes that many entrepreneurial 
firms in these economies have been actively engaged in political activities, through which 
organizational arrangements are created to co-opt government agencies into their organizational 
structures to manipulate and even control unfavorable institutional environments. It empirically 
evaluates the role of one such organizational arrangement – public-private hybrid forms – in 
China’s gradual reform period. It suggests that, through protecting property rights and facilitating 
access to key resources and opportunities, public-private hybrid forms may act as a substitute for 
deficient market and legal institutions, thus facilitating entrepreneurial reinvestment. The 
findings from a national sample of Chinese entrepreneurial firms support our propositions. In 
general, entrepreneurial firms adopting public-private hybrid forms enjoy higher entrepreneurial 
reinvestment rates than pure private firms during gradual reform; and this may be the case 
because such forms help to both protect private property rights and access key resources and 
opportunities. In addition, the association between the forms and reinvestment rate is found 
higher under less developed government institutions. 
Key words – Public-private hybrid forms; Entrepreneurial political activities, Entrepreneurial 
reinvestment rate; Legal and market institutions; China  





Recent entrepreneurship literature has highlighted association between institutions (especially, 
formal government institutions) and entrepreneurship (see, e.g., reviews by Bruton et al., 2010; 
Jennings et al., 2013; and Minniti and Levesque, 2008).1 Classical institutional scholars have 
forcefully argued for the role of formal government institutions in facilitating entrepreneurial 
investment, which subsumes entrepreneurial reinvestment and is central to the process of 
entrepreneurship because it determines entrepreneurial survival and growth (Casson, 1982; 
North, 1990). North (1990, 2005) suggests that property rights institutions promulgated by the 
state are fundamental, because enterprising individuals will invest only when they expect to be 
able to keep the fruits of their investments. While focusing on a broader set of government 
institutions, Baumol (1990) also argues that formal institutions are key to understanding 
entrepreneurial investment activities. Nevertheless, a number of researchers have found that, 
despite the absence of developed formal government institutions, many less developed and, 
especially, transition economies have had high levels of entrepreneurial reinvestment for 
relatively long periods in the last several decades (see, e.g., Haber, 2002; McMillan and 
Woodruff, 1999, 2002; Zhou, 2013). A natural question, therefore, is: Why have these 
economies had such high levels of entrepreneurial reinvestment for relatively long periods? 
To partially answer this question, this study, adopting resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), suggests that many entrepreneurial firms in some less developed 
and transition economies have been actively engaged in purposive political activities. Such 
political activities, however, are not institutional entrepreneurship per se, which aims to shape 
                                                 
1 While entrepreneurship is defined by Schumpeter (2008[1934]) as carrying out of new combinations, many 
empirical papers operationalize entrepreneurship as founding of a new business, which does not necessarily involve 
carrying out of new combinations (Shane, 2003). This study adopts the non-Schumpeterian, operational definition of 




government policy, as is common in the existing literature (Bruton et al., 2010; Garud et al., 
2007; Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al., 2013). Instead, these firms create organizational 
arrangements to co-opt government agencies into their organizational structures in order to 
manipulate and even control unfavorable institutional environments (Selznick, 1949; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978).  
This study focuses on one such firm-level organizational arrangement called public-
private hybrid forms, which were widespread in some transition economies, e.g., China (e.g., 
Ahlstrom et al., 2008; C. Chen, 1999; W. Chen, 2007; Gregory, et al., 2000; Huang, 2008; Nee, 
1992; M. Peng, 2001; Tsang, 1996; Walder and Oi, 1999; Whiting, 1999), Hungary and Poland 
(e.g., Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Stark, 1996), and Vietnam (e.g., 
Walder and Nguyen, 2008), particularly during their gradual reform periods. Transition 
economies during gradual reform are a particularly suitable case for examining the role of firm-
level organizational arrangements in facilitating entrepreneurial reinvestment because of the lack 
of full socio-political legitimacy of private firms and, thus, even more acute problem of deficient 
government institutions than other less-developed economies (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; M. Peng, 
2001, 2003; Tsang, 1996; Zhou, 2009). Given the unfavorable institutional environment, many 
private firms in these economies have been engaged in purposive political activities for survival 
and growth (Zhou, 2009). And public-private hybrid forms are a result of such activities, which 
are political in nature because they involve bargaining and even collusion between entrepreneurs 
and government agencies/officials over firms’ property rights (M. Peng, 2001; Walder and Oi, 
1999). Under a public-private hybrid form, although hybrid firms are de facto private, as they are 




public, since they are registered as public firms and need to share residual income with 
government agencies (C. Chen, 1999; Nee, 1992; M. Peng, 2001; Walder and Nguyen, 2008).2  
While the previous literature has studied extensively why and how entrepreneurs adopt 
public-private hybrid forms in some transition economies (see, e.g., Ahlstrom et al., 2008; C. 
Chen, 1999; W. Chen, 2007; Nee, 1992; M. Peng, 2001; Walder and Nguyen, 2008; Whiting, 
1999), empirically, it is still not known whether or how these forms facilitate entrepreneurial 
reinvestment during gradual reform. While such forms may facilitate entrepreneurial 
reinvestment because they help control unfavorable institutional environments, they may also 
discourage it because they dilute the property rights of entrepreneurial firms (Nee, 1992). In 
addition, while the existing literature suggests that the role of public-private hybrid forms may 
vary with institutional environments (e.g., Nee, 1992; Walder and Oi, 1999), there has been a 
lack of systematic research on how the significance of these forms is related to variations in legal 
and market institutions.   
To fill in these gaps in the previous literature, this study employs data from a national 
survey of Chinese private firms in 1996. China adopted a gradual reform strategy for its 
industrial sector in the first two decades of the economic reform (1978 – 1998). As such, 
government institutions were not conducive to private entrepreneurship in 1996, in general, and 
many domestic entrepreneurial firms still adopted public-private hybrid forms (Gregory et al., 
2000). 3 The dataset has a unique advantage in that it includes a national sample of 1946 private 
                                                 
2 In this sense, they are discrete property forms that fall between public and private firms and are different from the 
hybrids discussed in previous organizational literature, which include forms that combine either different organizing 
logics (Haveman and Rao, 2006) or different features of market and hierarchy, such as network organizations 
(Williamson, 1991) or different parts of two or more organizations, such as strategic alliances and joint-ventures 
(Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976).  
3 Domestic private entrepreneurial firms in China are mostly small and medium-sized enterprises owned by 
individual entrepreneurs and include both pure private firms and public-private hybrid firms. While public-private 
hybrid firms are de facto private firms with de jure public ownership as defined above, pure private firms are 




enterprises owned de facto by private entrepreneurs, with both pure private firms (i.e., 
enterprises owned by private entrepreneurs both de facto and de jure) and public-private hybrid 
firms (i.e., de facto private firms with de jure public ownership) included. I test whether and how 
public-private hybrid forms facilitate entrepreneurial reinvestment with fixed effects models. 
And the changing role of hybrid forms under varying government institutions is tested by 
comparing the roles of such forms in different provincial regions with different levels of 
institutional development using Hierarchical Linear Models.  
This study has the following findings. In general, entrepreneurial firms adopting public-
private hybrid forms enjoy higher entrepreneurial reinvestment rates than pure private firms 
during gradual reform; and this may be the case because such forms help to both protect private 
property rights and access key resources and opportunities. In addition, the association between 
the forms and reinvestment rate is found higher under less developed government institutions. 
These results make the following contributions to the existing literature. First, for the literature 
on resource dependence theory, the results demonstrate that, in addition to shaping government 
regulations, creating firm-level organizational arrangements to co-opt government agencies into 
the organizational structures of firms is an effective political activity for controlling an 
unfavorable institutional environment. Second, for the entrepreneurship literature, the results 
suggest that entrepreneurial political activities such as creating public-private hybrid forms are 
key to understanding high entrepreneurial reinvestment rates, and, thus, high entrepreneurial 
growth, in the absence of well-developed government institutions. Third, for the literature on 
public-private hybrid forms, the results demonstrate that such forms can facilitate property rights 
                                                 
firms, pure private firms have clearly defined property rights with little government involvement (Naughton, 2007). 
There are two types of pure private firms in China: non-farm private enterprises (siying qiye) and individual 
enterprises (getihu). The difference between a private enterprise and an individual enterprise is that the former has at 




protection and access to resources and opportunities, thus facilitating entrepreneurial 
reinvestment; yet, their net benefits depend on the overall institutional environment.      
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Institutional environment for entrepreneurship during gradual reform 
Following North (1990) and Baumol (1990), the recent literature has suggested that formal 
government institutions – particularly, an independent legal system for property rights protection 
(e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Johnson et al., 2002) and a developed market system 
(Minniti, 2008; Sobel, 2008; Zhou, 2011) – are key to facilitating entrepreneurial reinvestment in 
both the developed and developing worlds. However, although many less developed and, 
particularly, transition economies have had high levels of entrepreneurial reinvestment for 
decades, they have not had strong and independent legal infrastructures (Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
M. Peng, 2003; Zhou, 2013), and have lacked sufficient intermediaries in capital, labor, and 
product markets (Aidis et al., 2008; M. Peng, 2003; Puffer et al., 2009). 
For transition economies during their gradual reform periods, the problem of deficient 
government institutions has been further exacerbated by the lack of socio-political legitimacy of 
private firms. Socio-political legitimacy here refers to the perception of desirability of 
organizational activity within the larger economic and political system (Suchman, 1995; Zhou, 
2009). During gradual reform periods such as those in Hungary and Poland in the 1980s, China 
in the 1980s and 1990s, and Vietnam in the 1990s and 2000s, the Marxist-Leninist party was not 
dissolved but still had a tight control over both political and economic arenas. However, the 
party would allow private property and firms, as well as markets, to emerge and develop 




services). The result was thus a mixed economy with both government-owned and private 
enterprises, and with both government economic planning and market mechanisms (Kornai, 
1992; Nee, 1992). Yet, the governments continued to embrace the socialist ideology of public 
ownership and were reluctant to provide full socio-political legitimacy to private 
entrepreneurship (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; M. Peng, 2001, 2003; Tsang, 1996; Zhou, 2009).  
Low socio-political legitimacy had a profound effect on private firms. First, with low 
legitimacy, private firms usually faced considerable hostility from many government officials, 
who believed that private entrepreneurship would not only undermine the socialist system but 
threaten public firms by heightening domestic competition (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; Tsang, 1996; 
Zhou, 2009). As a result, private firms encountered not only ideological harassment from 
conservative officials but arbitrarily high rates of taxes, fees and levies from government 
agencies, and blackmail and extortion from other organizations, e.g., public firms (Ahlstrom et 
al., 2008; Y. Peng, 2004; Zhou, 2009). And the legal systems, which were not independent but 
under the tight control of the Marxist-Leninist party, seldom protected the legal rights of private 
firms, particularly when they had disputes with public firms or agencies (Nee, 1992; Nee and 
Opper, 2012). 
 Low legitimacy was also partly responsible for the unlevel playing field between public 
and private firms, meaning that public firms enjoyed more favorable treatment than private firms 
in terms of access to resources and opportunities (Gregory et al., 2000). During the gradual 
reform, the government still controlled most key resources (e.g., capital, land, and technologies) 
and opportunities (e.g., access to sales networks), and distributed these more on the basis of 
political than economic considerations (Gregory et al., 2000).4  
                                                 
4 One example for the unlevel playing field is that, until 1998, the Chinese central bank had annual lending quotas, 




Given these deficient government institutions, how do we account for the high level of 
entrepreneurial reinvestment in many less developed economies, particularly those transition 
economies under gradual reform? While a number of explanations may be offered, such as fast 
economic growth and, thus, high demand for consumer goods in these economies (Hoskisson et 
al., 2000), and the roles played by informal social institutions such as entrepreneurs’ network ties 
(e.g., Aidis et al., 2008; Li and Zhang, 2007; Peng and Luo, 2000; Tan et al., 2009; Xin and 
Pearce, 1996), one key factor may be purposive political activities of entrepreneurial firms. 
 
2.2. Firms’ political activities and public-private hybrid forms  
First formulated by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), resource dependence theory was one of the 
earliest organizational theories to recognize that firms often actively engage in purposeful 
political activities to control and manipulate their unfavorable environment. According to this 
theory, firms depend on their contextual environment for both legitimacy and resources in order 
to survive; however, although constrained by their environment, they can act to reduce 
environmental uncertainty and dependence. Depending on the nature of the environment, firms 
can use different strategies for reducing uncertainty and dependence. To minimize dependence 
on other organizations that provide vital resources, firms may engage in different kinds of inter-
organizational arrangements, such as interlocks, alliances, joint ventures, mergers and 
acquisitions (see reviews in Hillman et al., 2009; Drees and Heugens, 2013). For the larger social 
                                                 
was completely outside of its consideration (Zhou, 2009). For another example, in Russia, private firms were 
prohibited from entering several key industries. One case in point is that, in the early 1990s, the Russian government 
permitted Gazprom – the state-controlled gas corporation – to monopolize the production, sale, transport, and export 
of natural gas. In addition, Gazprom was exempt from the export tax, some import tariffs, and the value-added tax 




system (e.g., the government), however, firms may adopt political means and activities to alter 
the condition of such an external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).     
Firms may engage in a variety of political activities. The existing empirical research 
focuses primarily on how large corporations attempt to shape government regulations in ways 
that are favorable to them (Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al., 2013; Oliver, 1991). This study, 
however, suggests that, given their relatively small size and low socio-political legitimacy and 
influence, entrepreneurial firms in transition economies during gradual reform often do not have 
the capacity to shape government policy. Instead, they create firm-level organizational 
arrangements to co-opt government agencies into their organizational structures in order to 
reduce uncertainty and dependence. The public-private hybrid forms discussed here represent 
such firm-level organizational arrangements created by entrepreneurs during gradual reform. 
According to the existing literature, there have been two major public-private hybrid forms 
during gradual reform.  
 One form is so-called “red-hat” firms: A private entrepreneur would register his/her 
private startup as a de jure public firm with permission from a government agency (Nee, 1992; 
M. Peng, 2001; Walder and Oi, 1999). Yet, the entrepreneurs would continue to operate such 
firms as private, although they would need to pay a percentage (usually negotiable, but around 2 
percent) of gross profit to the government as a “management fee” (C. Chen, 1999; W. Chen, 
2007; Nee, 1992; Whiting, 1999). “Red-hat” firms were found primarily in China in the 1980s 
and 1990s, although they continued to exist even in the 2000s (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; He and 
Zhang, 2006; Huang, 2008). Conservative estimates suggest that at least 20 percent of all private 




 Rented firms would involve a private entrepreneur renting a public firm, which was, 
usually, small in size, on a long-term basis based on one-to-one bargaining with the government 
(Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Megginson and Netter, 2001; M. Peng, 2001; Stark, 1996). The private 
entrepreneurs – usually managers or workers of the public firms – would operate the rented firms 
as though they were their own, although they needed to share residual income streams – with 
negotiable percentages – with the government (M. Peng 2001; Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Walder 
and Oi, 1999). This is virtually a form of informal or hidden privatization because the lease 
agreements were widely viewed by the entrepreneurial lease-holders, as well as by the 
employees and the public, as de facto private property rights (Lipton and Sachs, 1990; M. Peng, 
2001). Rented firms were found in a number of transition economies during their earlier reform 
periods, such as China in the 1980s and 1990s (M. Peng, 2001; Walder and Oi, 1999), many 
central and eastern European countries in the 1980s (Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Megginson and 
Netter, 2001; Stark, 1996), and Vietnam in the 1990s and 2000s (Walder and Nguyen, 2008). In 
central and eastern Europe, workers within the firms already rented thousands of small State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) through auctions before the collapse of the communist regimes 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
 Under both forms, the hybrid firms, though de facto private, were legally owned by a 
government agency or agencies. In terms of the three types of property rights – to use or control 
assets, to receive income flows from assets, and to exchange assets with others (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1973), one could say that the entrepreneurs enjoyed virtually all control rights and at 




government agencies, however, enjoyed part of the income and exchange rights of the firms only 
(Walder and Oi, 1999).5 
 It should be noted that government agencies also played an active role in the creation of 
both forms. This is because such hybrid firms not only brought direct government revenues 
(management fees or rents) but could also facilitate economic growth. Since the beginning of the 
economic reforms, socialist governments from Asia to East Europe had all faced stagnant 
economies with overall lossmaking public firms and deteriorating government revenues (Kornai, 
1992; Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Naughton, 2007). Therefore, many socialist governments adopted 
informal privatization policies by leasing small public firms to enterprising individuals (often 
firm insiders, including both managers and workers) in order to increase the efficiency of these 
firms (Lipton and Sachs, 1990; M. Peng, 2001; Stark, 1996; Walder and Oi, 1999). In China, 
local governments in many regions even colluded with private entrepreneurs to allow private 
firms with pubic disguise (i.e., “red-hat” firms) to emerge and grow in order to create jobs and 
bring in tax revenue (C. Chen, 1999; Walder and Oi, 1999; Whiting, 1999). Therefore, it may be 
argued that the two forms were a result of both the co-optation of government agencies into firm 
structure by private entrepreneurs and the co-optation of private entrepreneurs into public firms 
by government agencies.  
 
2.3. Public-private hybrid forms and entrepreneurial reinvestment 
                                                 
5 While entrepreneurs enjoyed full control rights in both “red-hat” and rented firms, they might have had more 
income and exchange rights by taking the form of red-hat firms than by renting public firms. This is because most of 
the capital in “red-hat” firms came from private entrepreneurs, while capital in rented firms was initially from 
government agencies, although the private entrepreneurs were usually allowed to invest in the rented firms and also 
to purchase public shares and thus to have more control over the firm assets (Gregory, et al., 2000; Walder and 
Nguyen, 2008).  




Could public-private hybrid forms facilitate entrepreneurial reinvestment? This study suggests 
that such forms may both facilitate and discourage entrepreneurial reinvestment, and that the net 
effect depends on the overall institutional environment.  
Resource dependence theorists suggest that co-opting more powerful external interests 
into an internal structure is an effective strategy for relatively less powerful organizations to 
neutralize institutional opposition, thus helping them to both enhance socio-political legitimacy 
(Selznick, 1949; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and access political support and resources (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Oliver, 1991). In particular, ownership-based arrangements may be even 
more advantageous in enhancing legitimacy and stabilizing resource supply relationships than 
non-ownership arrangements, such as interlocks and alliances (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; see 
also, Drees and Heugens, 2013).   
In view of this theory, as ownership-based arrangements that co-opt government agencies 
into an internal structure through both surrendering legal ownership to the latter and sharing 
incomes (e.g., management fees or rents) with them, public-private hybrid forms may also bring 
to the entrepreneurial firms at least two types of benefits that may facilitate entrepreneurial 
reinvestment. First, given their de jure public ownership – the socio-politically more legitimate 
ownership form during gradual reform – public-private hybrid firms would enjoy higher socio-
political legitimacy and, thus, better property rights protection in the absence of effective legal 
systems. Compared to pure private firms, hybrid firms would enjoy better protection of property 
rights in two ways. First, being de jure public firms, they could avoid ideological and political 
campaigns launched against them by powerful higher level conservative officials, and could 
enjoy lower tax rates (Dai, 2005; He and Zhang, 2006). Second, de jure public ownership could 




facing such infringements, unlike pure private firms, a hybrid firm could legitimately involve 
government authorities in the case to enhance its negotiating or legal position (Nee, 1992). Given 
that better protection of private property rights is a necessary condition for entrepreneurs to 
invest (North, 1990), it follows that hybrid firms may have higher reinvestment rates than pure 
private firms.  
Second, because of their de jure public ownership and income sharing with government 
agencies, hybrid firms might enjoy better access to key resources and opportunities, most of 
which would be still controlled by the government, than pure private firms under the unlevel 
playing field (Nee, 1992). Indeed, a report based on large sample survey data from China 
suggested that public-private hybrid forms were indeed “helpful in securing access to land, 
assets, finance, and markets,” and that local governments often subsidized locally-owned public 
firms, including hybrid firms, through favorable contracts or loans on preferential terms 
(Gregory, et al., 2000, p. 20). Given that a reinvestment decision is not simply reinvesting profits 
into the firm, but is also concerned with the mobilization of substantial economic resources and 
opportunities (Child and Yuan, 1996), it follows that hybrid firms may, again, have higher 
reinvestment rates than pure private firms.  
Despite the benefits discussed above, some previous studies suggest that public-private 
hybrid forms could also involve ambiguous property rights (Dai, 2005; He and Zhang, 2006; 
Nee, 1992). Indeed, the fact that entrepreneurs were de facto owners of firms and government 
agencies owned the firms in legal terms already suggests a certain degree of ambiguity in terms 
of property rights. Furthermore, it is relatively common that both the entrepreneurs and the 
government had claims over (parts of) firm properties. Although “red-hat” firms were 




production and services upon the request of the entrepreneurs (Gregory, et al., 2000). For rented 
public firms, entrepreneurs were also allowed to invest and/or purchase government shares, 
despite the fact that they were still public firms, legally. To make things worse, the two parties 
usually did not have a common understanding concerning the shares that each should have 
because of difficulties in pricing the properties over which each had claims (Dai, 2005). 
Such ambiguous property rights could make entrepreneurs vulnerable to disputes with the 
government agencies. In China, for example, numerous stories emerged in newspapers about 
disputes over firm properties between government agencies and entrepreneurs in “red-hat” or 
rented firms since the mid-1990s; and entrepreneurs were usually the losers in such disputes 
(Dai, 2005; Liu, 2002; Zhang and Ming, 2000). In extreme cases, firms were even confiscated by 
local governments, and their private owners were sentenced for embezzlement of “public assets” 
simply because they had taken some profits for personal use (Dai, 2005; He and Zhang, 2006). 
Given such potential disputes, and given that clearly defined property rights are a necessary 
condition for entrepreneurs to invest (Grossman and Hart, 1986; North, 1990), one may reason 
that public-private hybrid firms would reinvest less than pure private firms, which are owned by 
private entrepreneurs only and, thus, presumably have clearly defined property rights.  
While public-private hybrid forms may indeed discourage entrepreneurial reinvestment, it 
is argued here that the costs of the forms may be relatively small, compared to their benefits, 
during gradual reform periods because of poorly developed government institutions. As 
discussed previously, there existed symbiotic relationships between entrepreneurs and 
government agencies during gradual reform, in general. Thus, both parties would be cautious 
enough not to allow potential conflicts to jeopardize their common interests (i.e., growing the 




between government agencies and entrepreneurs by the mid-1990s; and such disputes increased 
rapidly only after China introduced elements of radical reform by maintaining state control over 
large public firms but privatizing small ones (“grasping the big and getting rid of small”) in the 
late 1990s (Dai, 2005; Liu, 2002). Therefore, it is argued here that the overall association 
between public-private hybrid forms and reinvestment rates may be positive during gradual 
reform.  
   
Hypothesis 1. Public-private hybrid firms on average will have higher reinvestment rates 
than pure private firms during gradual reform.  
 
The previous discussion suggests that, overall, public-private hybrid forms could 
facilitate entrepreneurial reinvestment through two mechanisms, namely, better protection of 
property rights and easier access to government-controlled key resources and opportunities. To 
test these mechanisms, I propose the next several hypotheses. Hypothesis 2.1 and Hypothesis 2.2 
test whether the forms help protect private property rights, with the former focusing on 
government expropriation and the latter on infringement of property rights by other individuals 
and organizations. Hypothesis 2.3 tests whether these forms facilitate access to critical 
government-controlled resources and opportunities.6  
Hypothesis 2.1. Public-private hybrid firms will encounter lower government 
expropriation than pure private firms during gradual reform.  
                                                 
6 To formally test the mediating effect of these mechanisms, one should show that (i) public-private hybrid forms 
facilitate better protection of property rights and easier access to key resources and opportunities and (ii) the latter, 
in turn, facilitate entrepreneurial reinvestment (MacKinnon et al., 2007). However, since the previous literature has 
already established that entrepreneurial reinvestment is positively associated with better property rights protection 
(e.g., Cull and Xu, 2005; Johnson et al., 2002; Zhou, 2013) and easier access to key resources and opportunities 
(Child and Yuan, 1996; Zhou, 2013), part (ii) is not retested in this study and I focus on part (i) only, as in 




Hypothesis 2.2. Public-private hybrid firms will enjoy better government protection of 
legal firm rights than pure private firms during gradual reform.  
Hypothesis 2.3. Public-private hybrid firms will access critical government-controlled 
resources and opportunities more easily than pure private firms during gradual reform.  
 
Resource dependence theory suggests that the effect of firm strategy for reducing 
resource dependence is not constant but varies as government regulations vary (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). One example is that, as the government passes stricter antitrust legislation, 
ownership-based arrangements such as joint ventures, acquisitions and mergers will affect 
liaising organizations’ market shares and financial returns negatively because the organizations 
are obliged by the law to divest synergetic parts of an acquired target or to invest heavily in 
meeting new compliance demands (Drees and Heugens, 2013). In our case, it is argued above 
that public-private hybrid forms may facilitate entrepreneurial reinvestment when developed 
government institutions are largely missing. Yet, given that transition economies under gradual 
reform all adopted market and legal reforms, one may wonder how the association between 
public-private hybrid forms and reinvestment rates would vary under different government 
institutions.  
Some earlier studies suggest that market reforms in transition economies might lead to a 
hybrid economic system, which differs from both market capitalism and state socialism with 
various hybrid organizational forms dominating economic organizations. Stark (1996), for 
example, argued that post-reform Hungarian economy might have been dominated by networked 
groups of firms that blurred conventional organizational boundaries and included both 




Enterprises (TVEs), many of which were “red-hat” firms (He and Zhang, 2006; Huang, 2008), 
might have been a more competitive organizational form than either SOEs or pure private firms 
in China’s emerging market economy. Based on the logic of these earlier studies, it follows that 
public-private hybrid forms may continue to benefit private entrepreneurs, thus facilitating 
entrepreneurial reinvestment, even with more developed government institutions.     
It is argued here that the association between hybrid forms and entrepreneurial 
reinvestment may be lower under more developed government institutions (particularly, property 
rights institutions and the market system) for the following reasons. First, the benefits of hybrid 
forms may be lower under more developed government institutions. As private property rights 
are more protected by government institutions, private entrepreneurship would enjoy higher 
socio-political legitimacy; and government expropriation of private properties, as well as 
infringement of property rights by other individuals and organizations, would be lower (Lu and 
Tao, 2008; Nee, 1992; Zhou, 2013). In addition, as the market system (i.e., markets for factors 
and products) is more developed, private entrepreneurs and their firms could find alternative 
sources of resources and opportunities from the market, and thus would rely less on the 
government for these resources/opportunities (Gregory et al., 2000; Peng and Luo, 2000; Zhou, 
2014). Therefore, the significance of public-private hybrid forms for both property rights 
protection and access to critical resources and opportunities would be lower.  
Second, the lower benefits of public-private hybrid forms under more developed 
government institutions may lead to a series of chain reactions, which, in turn, could increase 
internal conflict between government agencies and private entrepreneurs. Previously, it has been 
discussed that the amount of such internal conflict may be relatively low under poorly developed 




benefit from public-private hybrid forms. Under more developed government institutions, 
however, with lower benefits of the forms, many entrepreneurs of the hybrid firms might want to 
share less residual incomes (i.e., management fees or rents) with their partnering government 
agencies, and might even ask for privatization of the firms, i.e., getting rid of the de jure public 
ownership of the “red-hat” firms or the rented firms and re-registering them as pure private firms 
(Dai, 2005; He and Zhang, 2006). While some government agencies might indeed concede to 
such requests, most would not and would even attempt to exercise control rights or confiscate the 
firms, thus worsening the internal conflict (Dai, 2005). 
Given the lower benefits and higher costs of public-private hybrid forms, it is argued here 
that the association between public-private hybrid forms and entrepreneurial reinvestment rates 
may be weaker under more developed property rights institutions and factor and product 
markets. Thus, we have: 
Hypothesis 3. During gradual reform, the association between public-private hybrid 
forms and entrepreneurial reinvestment rate will be lower under better government protection of 
private property rights. 
Hypothesis 4. During gradual reform, the association between public-private hybrid 
forms and entrepreneurial reinvestment rate will be lower under more developed markets. 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1. Data 
The empirical test uses a national sample of domestic private enterprises in 1996 from China’s 
transition economy. The sample is appropriate for this test for several reasons. First, given that 




deregulating a number of factor and product markets only in 1998, and given that private 
property rights were not protected by the Chinese Constitution until 2004, the sample firms in 
1996 still faced deficient government institutions with poorly protected property rights, an 
unlevel playing field, and less developed factor and product markets in general (McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2002; Naughton, 2007).7 Second, the sample includes both pure private firms and 
public-private hybrid firms, and thus enables us to evaluate the role of public-private hybrid 
forms in entrepreneurial reinvestment. Third, it is noted that government institutions differed 
dramatically across Chinese regions during the entire gradual reform period, thanks to the 
decentralization reform that the Chinese government adopted in the early 1980s (Chen et al., 
2000; Fan and Wang, 2001; Zhou, 2011). This variation in the formal institutional environment 
allows us to test how the association between public-private hybrid forms and reinvestment rate 
changes under different government institutions. 
  The sample firms come from the 1997 National Survey of Chinese Private Enterprises, 
which was sponsored by the Chinese government and designed and administered by a joint 
research team from both the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and All China Federation of 
Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) – a semi-governmental commercial organization that serves 
the interests of private entrepreneurs by connecting them with the Chinese Communist Party 
(Zhang and Ming, 2000). According to the Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises 
promulgated by the central government in 1988, private enterprises are domestic profit-making 
economic units invested in and established by natural persons, or controlled by natural persons, 
using employed labor and with employment size of at least eight (Zhou, 2009). Some of the 
                                                 
7 In fact, some researchers have suggested that the institutional environment for entrepreneurship throughout the 




sample firms (about 47 percent) were selected from the list of private enterprises registered with 
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and the remaining sample (53 percent) 
came from the list of member firms of the ACFIC.  
  Member firms of the ACFIC were usually larger and more visible than other private 
enterprises in each region; thus, to include more ACFIC member firms biases the sample toward 
larger private enterprises. The reason that more ACIFC member firms were included is that one 
of the purposes of the 1997 survey was to include some “red-hat” firms and rented public firms, 
and many ACFIC member firms were such.8 According to The Stipulation on Several Questions 
about the ACFIC promulgated on July 6, 1991 by the Department of United Front of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, members of the ACFIC primarily included private 
enterprises, individual enterprises, some collective enterprises, and a few small and medium 
SOEs. These collective enterprises and SOEs were usually owned or controlled, at least partially, 
by private entrepreneurs, who joined the ACFIC primarily through self-nomination (Asian 
Development Bank, 2003).    
  Through the use of a stratified sampling method, a total of 1946 private enterprises were 
sampled from the 21 surveyed provinces, among which five came from the Southeastern-Coastal 
regions, four from Northern regions, six from the Western regions, and four from the Mid-
Central regions. The sampling involved two stages. In the first stage, a pre-specified number of 
counties were selected in each province based on economic development level so that both rich 
and poor counties were represented. In the second stage, a pre-specified number of sample firms 
were selected in each county based on location and primary industrial sector. Both urban and 
rural firms were chosen, and, within each urban/rural area, firms from all industrial sectors were 
                                                 




sampled. The survey was based on face-to-face intensive interviews with entrepreneurs (i.e., the 
largest private owners) to collect information about them and their firms at the end of 1996. The 
interviewers were local employees of the ACFIC who were familiar with local private 
entrepreneurs and had been trained intensively by the joint research team.9  
The survey data asked about the registration status of each sample firm (i.e., whether the 
firm was registered as a SOE, a collective enterprise, or a private firm) at the end of 1996 in 
order to identify whether it was a public-private hybrid firm. In addition to registration status, the 
survey asked a rich set of other questions, covering the size, history, reinvestment behaviors, and 
basic financial backgrounds of the firms, and the human capital and occupational history of the 
entrepreneurs. Most variables on the basic characteristics of the firms and entrepreneurs in the 
survey data are also available in the 1995 and 2000 National Surveys of Chinese Private 
Enterprises, which include more firms and more provinces but do not contain registration status 
– the key independent variable – for testing the hypotheses. Distributions of the common 
variables are similar across the three surveys.10          
Following Johnson, et al. (2002) and Cull and Xu (2005), who tested the effect of legal 
protection of property rights on firms’ reinvestment rates using data from East Europe or China, 
only firms with positive profits in 1996 enter the reinvestment regressions. Thus, 91 firms that 
reported negative or zero profits were removed from the data. The dropped firms accounted for 
4.7 percent of the sample; they were a little bit younger and smaller, and more likely to have 
female owners. This procedure leaves a working sample of 1855 entrepreneurial firms. Table 1 
                                                 
9 The joint research team did not disclose the response rate. However, it had taken several measures to ensure the 
representativeness of the sample. For example, whenever a firm declined the interview, another firm with very 
similar characteristics in the same area and same industry had to be found to replace it.     
10 The three surveys selected different firm samples each year and, thus, panel data models are not applicable for the 




describes the distributions of the study variables in this working sample, and Table 2 is the 
correlation matrix between the variables.  
 [Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
 
3.2. Dependent variables 
Following previous studies (e.g., Johnson, et al., 2002; Cull and Xu, 2005), the dependent 
variable in hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 – reinvestment rate – is measured as the percentage of the net 
profit (i.e., profit after taxes, fees and levies) earned in 1996 that was kept for reinvestment in the 
firm. This variable has a mean of 0.62, which is not significantly different from the mean of the 
same variable from the 1995 and 2000 National Surveys of Chinese Private Enterprises (0.68 for 
the 1995 survey, and 0.58 for the 2000 survey). Because the distribution of the dependent 
variable is skewed, its logarithmic form is used (a small number is used to replace zero for 
logarithmic transformation).     
Based on North (1990; North and Weingast, 1989), government expropriation in 
Hypothesis 2.1 is measured with tax rate, which is calculated with total tax payment (i.e., the 
sum of all types of taxes, fees, and levies) divided by sales income in 1996. The tax rate for firms 
and entrepreneurs was negotiable during gradual reform, depending on the relationship with 
government agencies, and a lower tax rate indicated lower government expropriation (Kornai, 
1992; Naughton, 2007). This measure has been used in the China literature (Li et al., 2008). The 
primary reason to use sales income instead of gross profit as the denominator is that the largest 
tax for firms in China is the value-added tax, which is based on sales income (see Li et al., 2008). 




The survey asked entrepreneurs whether they could access help from a list of 
organizations (including government agencies) when encountering a number of problems. The 
dependent variables in hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 are constructed from these questions and are all 
binary variables. The dependent variable in Hypothesis 2.2 is access to government protection of 
firm rights. This variable is coded 1 if the entrepreneur could access help from relevant 
party/government agencies (such as the police) and the court system when his/her firm’s legal 
rights were being violated; 0, otherwise.     
For Hypothesis 2.3, multiple variables are used to measure entrepreneurs’ access to 
critical government-controlled resources and opportunities. Access to capital is coded 1 if the 
entrepreneur could access help from formal financial institutions, most of which were state-
owned, when the firm lacked financial capital; 0, otherwise. Access to sales market is coded 1 if 
the entrepreneur could access help from relevant party/government agencies when the firm had 
difficulty in selling products/services; 0, otherwise. Access to land is coded 1 if the entrepreneur 
could access help from relevant party/government agencies when the firm needed land; 0, 
otherwise. Access to technology is coded 1 if the entrepreneur could access help from relevant 
party/government agencies when the firm had difficulty in obtaining technologies; 0, otherwise.  
 
3.3. Independent variable 
Public firms include SOEs and collective enterprises in socialist economies. SOEs are owned, 
nominally, by all people in the society but, de facto, by the government (at either central or 
regional/local levels); and traditional collective enterprises are owned, nominally, by all workers 
in an enterprise but, de facto, by local governments (Kornai, 1992). In China, such traditional 




Chinese government established that shareholding cooperative enterprises (SCEs) – privately 
formed cooperatives engaged in industry – were also socialist in nature and considered collective 
enterprises, although investors in such ventures retained private ownership of their assets 
(Whiting, 1999). 
The survey intentionally included some public-private hybrid firms that were de facto 
private firms with de jure public registration status. One question asked whether a firm was a 
public-private hybrid firm or not: “what was the official registration status of your firm at the end 
of 1996?” And the answers included each of the four choices of public firms (i.e., SOEs, UCEs, 
TVEs, and SCEs), together with choices indicating de jure private ownership (i.e., private 
enterprises and individual enterprises). Individual enterprises were included in the survey 
because ACFIC member firms included such enterprises. Cross-tabulations of the data suggest 
that those sample firms that were registered as any of the four types of public firms were indeed 
owned and controlled de facto by the entrepreneurs. Analysis shows that, among 171 sample 
firms registered as “public” firms in the data, the largest individual owner’s capital investment, 
on average, consisted of 68 percent of the total capital of the firm, while investment from local 
governments and other public sources ranged from 0 to 12 percent. In addition, the entrepreneur 
had a final say on strategic decisions among 77 percent of these “public” firms; in only 23 
percent of such firms, the entrepreneur needed to share strategic decision making power with 
other members of the board of directors, which possibly included a government agency. Thus, it 
is clear that these firms were not real public firms, but public-private hybrid firms. 
Therefore, the independent variable – hybrid firm – is a binary variable and is coded 1 if 
the firm was registered as any of the four choices (a SOE, a UCE, a TVE, and a SCE) at the end 




1996. In more detail, 0.22 percent are SOEs, 2.22 percent urban collective enterprises, 2.50 
percent rural collective enterprises, and 4.55 percent shareholding cooperative enterprises.  
 
3.4. Moderating variables 
The moderating variables in hypotheses 3 and 4 are at the provincial level. Property rights 
protection – the moderating variable in Hypothesis 3 – is constructed from the above survey data 
and is the provincial means of entrepreneurs’ perception of property rights security. In the 
survey, entrepreneurs were asked whether (1) arbitrary charges, fines, or apportionments by 
government agents and (2) blackmail and extortion were significant social problems. According 
to North (1990) and Johnson et al. (2002), these two types of social problems suggest a predatory 
business environment, indicating insecure property rights. Unfortunately, only two answers – yes 
or no – were provided for this question in the survey. As such, the entrepreneur’s perception of 
property rights security is coded 1 if the entrepreneur did not think that these two types of 
government predatory behaviors were significant problems; 0, otherwise. And by taking the 
provincial means of this perception variable, we get property rights protection, which ranges 
from 12 percent to 46 percent, with a larger value indicating that a greater percentage of 
entrepreneurs agreed that they had property rights security in a province.  
While taking group means is a popular way to construct higher-level variables in social 
sciences (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002), I also used an alternative measure for provincial level 
property rights protection for a robustness test. The alternative measure is taken directly from the 
1997 National Economic Research Institute (NERI) Indices of Marketization of China’s 
Provinces, constructed by Fan and Wang (2001). This measure is based on two components: 




by GDP, both of which are taken as three-year averages (1995 – 1997). The correlation between 
this alternative measure and property rights protection is moderately high (r = 0.50).   
Market development – the moderating variable in Hypothesis 4 – is a composite index 
taken from the Extent of Marketization of Economic Systems in China (Chen, et al., 2000), which 
includes indices for the development of markets in each province in the mid-1990s. This variable 
directly measures the development of market intermediaries – resellers, physical distribution 
firms, marketing services agencies, and market-oriented financial intermediaries, which are key 
indicators for market development (Kornai, 1992; Naughton, 2007). It is the average of the 
following components: (1) number of marketplaces for products and factor resources per 1000 
people, (2) number of wholesale and retail sales trade enterprises per 1000 people, (3) number of 
employees in wholesale and retail sales trade enterprises per 1000 people, and (4) number of 
non-state financial institutions per 1000 people in each province. This variable was already 
normalized in the original source and ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating a higher 
level of market system development in a province.  
For a robustness test, an alternative measure for provincial level market development is 
used. This alternative measure is also taken directly from the 1997 National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI) Indices of Marketization of China’s Provinces, constructed by Fan and Wang 
(2001). It is based on a number of components reflecting the extent to which prices of products 
and factor resources were determined by the market rather than by the government. The 
correlation between this alternative measure and market development is high (r = 0.60).   
3.5. Control variables 
Firm size is measured by total sales income at the end of 1996. Larger firms are usually treated 




reinvestment rates (Gregory, et al., 2000; Zhou, 2009). This variable is taken natural logarithm to 
adjust for skewed distribution. Firm age is 1996 minus the year when the firm was established. 
Younger firms may have lower reinvestment rates because of the liability of newness and, thus, 
fewer entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1988; Hannan and Freeman, 1989). 
City firm is a binary variable used to control for the location of the main establishment of the 
firm because firms in cities (especially big cities) enjoyed better infrastructure and, possibly, also 
better institutional environments. It is coded 1 if it was located in big cities; 0, otherwise. The 
data indicate fifteen industrial sectors for the main business line of the firms. So, fourteen 
dummy variables for industrial sectors are also included in regressions (manufacturing sector as 
the comparison group). It is often argued that a higher profit rate may indicate higher 
entrepreneurial ability and more entrepreneurial opportunities, which can facilitate reinvestment 
(Johnson, et al., 2002). Thus, for testing hypotheses 1, 3 and 4, return on sales is also controlled, 
which is the ratio of net profit to total sales income in the 1996 financial year. Using return on 
capital, which has more missing data, does not change the statistical results. 
Concerning the entrepreneur, gender and human capital variables, including education 
and age are often considered to have effects on entrepreneurial behavior (see, e.g., Carroll and 
Mosakowski, 1987). Female is a binary variable coded 1 if an entrepreneur was a female; 0, 
otherwise. Based on Xie and Hannum (1996), education is measured by the number of years of 
schooling.11 Age is 1996 minus the year when the entrepreneur was born. Moreover, previous 
literature suggests that entrepreneurs’ political capital also plays a role in entrepreneurship in 
                                                 
11 The questionnaire asked the level of education. I transformed the levels into number of years in schooling using 
Xie and Hannum (1996)’s coding scheme. That is, 0 years for illiterate; 5 years for elementary school; 8 years for 
junior high school; 11 years for senior high school and vocational school; 13 years for associate degree; 15 years for 
bachelor’s degree; and 18 years for master’s degree. Using level of education instead of years of schooling does not 




transition economies (e.g., Róna-Tas, 1994; Wu, 2006; Zhou, 2009, 2013). Therefore, party 
member is a binary variable coded 1 if the entrepreneur was a Chinese Communist Party member 
at the end of 1996; 0, otherwise.   
When testing hypotheses 3 and 4, several provincial level variables are also controlled. 
GDP growth rate in 1996 is an indicator of regional economic health, which may be positively 
related with entrepreneurial opportunities and thus entrepreneurial reinvestment (Bowen and 
Clercq, 2008). East coastal provinces is a binary variable coded 1 if the province is located in the 
Southeastern-Coastal regions; 0, otherwise. These provinces had a more developed regional 
economy and better infrastructure; thus, entrepreneurs might have had more entrepreneurial 
opportunities and, thus, higher entrepreneurial reinvestment. Some authors also believe that these 
provinces had a higher proportion of public-private hybrid firms (Huang, 2008; Walder and Oi, 
1999). Centrally-administered city is coded 1 if a provincial region is a centrally administered 
municipal city – Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing; 0, otherwise. These cities are 
institutionally and economically different from other provincial regions because of their closer 
relationships with the central government. I have also attempted to control for other provincial 
level variables, such as GDP per capita, contribution of the industrial sector to the GDP, and 
provincial population. These variables were dropped from the regressions because they either 
have very high correlations with the provincial level variables already controlled or have no 
effect on either the dependent variable or the coefficients of other variables.     
Table 3 compares the means for the study variables between hybrid firms and pure 
private firms. It suggests that, on average, hybrid firms have easier access to government 
protection of property rights and government-controlled resources. In addition, it shows that the 




covariates, except that hybrid firms are larger, are located more in big cities, and are more likely 
owned by entrepreneurs with better education and party membership.     
  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
3.6. Model specification 
The sample firms were nested within 21 provinces, which were heterogeneous in their stages of 
gradual reform. Thus, for testing hypotheses 1 – 2.3, I estimated the fixed effects model with 
each province dummy added as a group specific constant term in each of the regressions to 
control for environmental heterogeneity across provinces (Greene, 2000). A general 
representation of the regressions that I estimated is shown in the following equation: 
 
ij ij ij j ijY    '  'X      H               (1) 
 
for i = 1, …, nj firms in province j; j = 1, …, 21 provinces.     
In the above equation, Yij is the dependent variable; α is the intercept; γ is the effect of 
hybrid firm on the dependent variable, because Hij denotes hybrid firm that varies over the i 
firm/entrepreneur in each j province; β is a vector of all other firm-level effects on the dependent 
variable, because Xij is a vector of firm-level control variables that vary over the i firm in each j 
province; ηj a vector of the province specific constant term and is thus the same across all units 
in province j; and εij is a mean zero firm-level error term. Since the dependent variables in 




dummy variable model – a version of the fixed effects model – is used. For hypotheses 2.2 and 
2.3, the dependent variables are binary, and thus the fixed effects logit model is used. 
For hypotheses 3 and 4, since the covariates come from both the firm and provincial 
levels, the fixed effects model is not appropriate because provincial level variables would be 
subsumed by province dummies. Instead, Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM) are used for testing 
these two hypotheses because HLM enable us to conceptualize in terms of multiple levels 
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). A general representation of the regressions used for testing 
hypotheses 3 and 4 is shown in the following equation:   
 
ij ij ij ij j j j ijY    '  '( ) 'X  'D 'P      jH H D                   (2) 
 
for i = 1, …, nj firms in province j; j = 1, …, 21 provinces.   
In this equation, Yij, α, γ, Hij, β, Xij, εij have the same meaning as in equation 1. However, 
ηj – the vector of province specific constant term in equation 1 – has been replaced by three 
provincial level items here: μ'Dj,  λ'Pj, and θj, and a new cross-level item – φ' (Hij×Dj) – has 
been added. Here, μ is the effect of property rights protection (or market development) on the 
dependent variable, because Dj denotes property rights protection (or market development) that 
varies over j provinces; λ is a vector of all other provincial level effects on the dependent 
variable, because Pij is a vector of provincial level control variables that vary over j provinces; θj 
is provincial level random effect and is the same across all units in province j; φ is the effect of 
the interaction between hybrid firm – Hij – and property rights protection (or market 




the same equation but are separated in two different equations because of high correlation 
between the two (r = 0.64).  
 
4. Regression results 
4.1. Major findings  
Results for testing Hypothesis 1 are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. Column 1 regresses 
reinvestment rate (logged) on control variables only, and column 2 adds hybrid firm into column 
1. The results from column 2 provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. The coefficient of hybrid 
firm is positive and statistically significant. On average, the reinvestment rate of public-private 
hybrid firms is 22.3 percent (e0.201-1) higher than that of pure private firms in the sample. 
The effects of several other control variables in column 2 of Table 4 are as follows. Firm 
size has a significantly positive effect, and, thus, smaller private firms indeed reinvested less 
because of even more unfavorable government treatment. Female has a large positive effect. One 
possible reason for this may be motivation. Previous research suggests that female entrepreneurs 
usually have stronger motivation, such as desiring for higher business achievement, than males 
(Cromie, 1987). Lastly, party member has a large positive effect on reinvestment rates, 
suggesting that political capital may indeed facilitate entrepreneurship in a transition economy. 
Results for testing Hypothesis 2.1 are presented in column 3 of Table 4. This column 
regresses tax rate (logged) on hybrid firm, all firm-level control variables except for return on 
sales, and all provincial dummies. The coefficient of hybrid firm is -0.192 and statistically 
significant. Substantively, on average, the estimate amounts to 0.83 (e-0.192) times less in total tax 
rate for hybrid firms than for pure private firms. Thus, Hypothesis 2.1 is also supported. 





Results for testing hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 are reported in Table 5. Overall, both 
hypotheses are strongly supported. The coefficient of hybrid firm in each column has the 
expected sign and is statistically significant. Compared to a pure entrepreneurial firm, the odds of 
access to government protection of firm rights are 1.41 (e0.344) times greater for a hybrid firm; the 
odds of access to capital are 1.65 (e0.503) times greater for a hybrid firm; the odds of access to 
sales market are 3.42 (e1.229) times greater for a hybrid firm; the odds of access to land are 1.83 
(e0.605) times greater for a hybrid firm; and the odds of access to technology are 3.30 (e1.193) times 
greater for a hybrid firm.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 6 reports results from the HLM for testing hypotheses 3 and 4 with all firm level 
and provincial level variables controlled. Column 1 in this table tests Hypothesis 3, which 
suggests that the association between hybrid firm and reinvestment rate would be lower in 
regions with more government protection of private property rights. Indeed, this column shows 
that the coefficient of hybrid firm is positive and significant, and that of the interaction between 
hybrid firm and property rights protection is negative and statistically significant. Substantively, 
the interaction coefficient suggests that, as the percentage of private firms that believed that 
government protection of private property rights was fine, increases by one percentage point, the 
coefficient of hybrid firm would decrease by 0.017. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported.    
Column 2 in Table 6 tests Hypothesis 4, which suggests that the association between 
hybrid firm and reinvestment rate would be lower in regions with more developed markets. It 




between hybrid firm and market development is negative and statistically significant. 
Substantively, the interaction coefficient suggests that as market development, which ranges 
from 0 to 1, increases by one percentage point, the coefficient of hybrid firm would decrease by 
0.081 (=0.805/100). Thus, Hypothesis 4 is also supported.    
The effects of provincial level variables in Table 6 also deserve mention here. Property 
rights protection has a significantly positive effect, supporting the notion that property rights 
protection is fundamental for entrepreneurial investment (North, 1990). Surprisingly, however, 
market development has no significant effect on reinvestment rate. Further analysis suggests that 
this is because of the high correlation between market development and centrally-administered 
city (r = 0.69). In fact, both variables show significantly positive effects on reinvestment rate if 
one variable is dropped.         
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.2. Robustness tests  
As noted above, the existing literature has identified two public-private hybrid forms, i.e., “red-
hat” firms and rented public firms. Do these two different forms have the same effect on 
entrepreneurial reinvestment, as suggested by previous scholars (see, e.g., M. Peng, 2001)? In 
this study, the data do not allow us to identify whether the hybrid firm was a “red-hat” or rented 
public firm. But the data do allow us to differentiate four types of registration status of hybrid 
forms: SOEs (located primarily in urban areas), UCEs (located in urban areas), TVEs (located in 
rural areas), and SCEs (located primarily in rural areas). It is noted that most of the firms that 
were registered as SOEs and UCEs were probably rented public firms, and most of the firms 




was more popular among urban firms and putting on a “red hat” was more common in rural areas 
(Naughton, 2007). Therefore, I test the effects of urban and rural hybrid firms separately. The 
results suggest that the hypotheses are virtually still supported.12   
Given the inevitable measurement errors in any group-level indices, one may wonder 
whether the results for testing hypotheses 3 and 4 reported above reflect the true effects of 
property rights protection and market development or the measurement errors of the two 
variables. To tackle this problem, I have tried using the alternative measures of both property 
rights protection and market development as discussed in Section 3.4 to retest the hypotheses. 
Additional tests suggest that both hypotheses are still strongly supported if the alternative 
measures are used.13 
This study does not formally test the mediating effect of better property rights protection 
and easier access to key resources and opportunities between hybrid firms and reinvestment rates 
for two reasons. In addition to the reason stated previously, in note 6, there are quite a lot of 
missing values in the measures of property rights protection and access to key resources and 
opportunities, making a formal test of the mediating effect problematic (Zhang and Wang, 2013). 
Nevertheless, I have tried adding all of the measures of property rights protection and access to 
government resources into the equation in column 2 of Table 4, and the coefficient of hybrid 
firm drops from 0.201 to 0.133. This suggests that property rights protection and access to 
                                                 
12 The results are as follows. Using urban hybrid firm, its coefficient for testing Hypothesis 1 is 0.277 (0.135); the 
interaction between it and property rights protection for testing Hypothesis 3 is -0.032 (0.020); the interaction 
between it and market development for testing Hypothesis 4 is -0.915 (0.630).  Using rural hybrid firm, its 
coefficient for testing Hypothesis 1 is 0.163 (0.080); the interaction between it and property rights protection for 
testing Hypothesis 3 is -0.134 (0.058); the interaction between it and market development for testing Hypothesis 4 is 
-0.761 (0.365). In the parentheses are province-clustered robust standard errors. The coefficients of both urban and 
rural hybrid firms for testing hypotheses 2.1-2.3 are all positive and most are also statistically significant.     
13 Using the two alternative measures, it is found that the interaction between hybrid firm and property rights 
protection for testing Hypothesis 3 is -0.030 (0.020), and the interaction between it and market development for 




government-controlled resources may indeed mediate the relationship between hybrid firms and 
reinvestment rates, at least partially.   
Table 3 suggests that, compared to pure private firms, hybrid firms are larger, are located 
more in big cities, and are more likely to be owned by entrepreneurs with better education and 
party membership. Thus, to compare the two types of firms more fairly, I have also tried multiple 
propensity score matching methods, which help reduce biases typical to observational studies by 
creating a sample of units that receive the treatment that is comparable on all observed covariates 
to a sample of units that does not receive the treatment (Morgan and Winship, 2007). And, the 
results still support the hypotheses (see Appendix 1 for results from one of the propensity score 
matching methods).      
 
5. Discussion  
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, it contributes to the 
literature on resource dependence theory by suggesting that creating firm-level organizational 
arrangements to co-opt government agencies into the organizational structure of firms is also an 
effective political activity for controlling environmental uncertainty. Following Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978), researchers have conducted extensive studies to understand how firms use 
political means and activities to alter the conditions of external political environments. Yet, the 
existing research focuses primarily on the political activities of large corporations in shaping 
government regulations in ways favorable to them (Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton et al., 2013; 
Oliver, 1991). Shaping government regulations, however, may be a less feasible option for many 
small firms, such as entrepreneurial firms during gradual reform because of their low socio-




arrangements to co-opt government agencies into their organizational structures may be a more 
viable choice.   
 Second, it contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by suggesting that entrepreneurial 
political activities matter. Primarily based on economic theorists such as North (1990, 2005) and 
Baumol (1990), prior entrepreneurship literature has focused on the role of government 
institutions in entrepreneurial development. Building on resource dependence theory, this study 
suggests that entrepreneurial political activities are key to understanding high entrepreneurial 
reinvestment rates, and thus high entrepreneurial growth, in many less developed economies, 
such as China during its gradual reform. Particularly, it demonstrates that, in the absence of well-
developed government institutions, entrepreneurial political activities can create firm-level 
organizational arrangements, such as public-private hybrid forms, to co-opt the government into 
its organizational structure and reduce environmental uncertainty, thus facilitating 
entrepreneurship.  
Third, it serves as an important addition to the growing literature on public-private hybrid 
forms. While this literature has noted some of the benefits and costs of such forms, little is 
known concerning their consequences for entrepreneurial firms. Focusing on entrepreneurial 
reinvestment, this study suggests that, given both benefits and costs, such forms may facilitate, as 
well as discourage, entrepreneurial reinvestment, and the net effect of the forms depends on the 
overall institutional environment. It has demonstrated that, under poorly developed government 
institutions during gradual reform, such forms may facilitate rather than discourage 
entrepreneurial reinvestment because the costs of such forms (i.e., ambiguous property rights) 
may be relatively small compared to their benefits (i.e., providing government protection of 




empirical evidence for the two benefits of such forms. In addition, this paper has shown that the 
association between such forms and reinvestment rates is higher under less developed 
government institutions, thus lending support to the notion that hybrid organizations substitute 
for, rather than complement, formal institutions (Williamson, 1991; see also, Nee, 1992).     
This study also has several limitations that may suggest future directions for research. 
First, this paper focuses on the payoffs of public-private hybrid forms to individual 
entrepreneurial firms under poorly developed government institutions, but ignores the possible 
negative externalities that such an entrepreneurial political activity may create for other firms 
(particularly, pure private firms) and for the society as a whole. Using Baumol’s (1990) 
categorization of three types of entrepreneurship (i.e., productive, unproductive, and destructive), 
firms’ political activities to resolve resource dependence may not always be productive for the 
society as whole, but might involve some elements of unproductive rent seeking. This is because 
favorable treatment from government agencies in terms of access to key resources and 
opportunities occurs often at the expense of other firms and tax-payers. In this sense, it is 
possible that the benefits obtained by public-private hybrid firms during gradual reform may also 
occur at the expense of less privileged firms, such as pure private firms. And to maintain their 
advantages, it is also possible that public-private hybrid firms may be less interested in pushing 
forward legal and market reforms, compared to pure private firms. As a result, it is possible that 
the higher the advantages of such forms, the slower the legal and market reforms. Given its scope 
and the data constraints, this paper cannot verify these possibilities. Future research may explore 
such negative externalities of public-private hybrid forms with appropriate data.                
Second, although this paper has established a positive association between public-private 




endogeneity issue. There may be two sources of endogeneity here. The first source is 
unmeasured but relevant variables that may have been omitted from the regression as in virtually 
all regression analyses. The second is the possibility of reverse causality given that the two 
variables are measured simultaneously. In our case, reverse causality may occur when firms that 
had strong motivation for growth and thus had higher reinvestment rate found it difficult to grow 
because of poorly developed government institutions, and thus adopted public-private hybrid 
forms in order to resolve institutional constraints.    
The endogeneity issue also exists when testing for the changing association between 
public-private hybrid forms and reinvestment rates under different government institutions. It is 
possible that there are unobservable provincial level factors that confound the moderating effect 
of government institutions. In addition, it may be possible that government institutions in at least 
some provinces may have been partly results of entrepreneurial political activities, although the 
previous literature suggests that this is less likely because of the weak socio-political influence of 
private firms in China during gradual reform (Gregory, et al., 2000; Naughton, 2007; Walder and 
Oi, 1999). Given the lack of a suitable instrumental variable, neither source of endogeneity is 
solvable with the current cross-sectional data. Future research may resolve the causality problem 
with an instrumental variable approach or a longitudinal research design. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Many less developed and, particularly, transition economies have had high levels of 
entrepreneurial reinvestment for relatively long periods despite the absence of developed 
government institutions. This study suggests that many entrepreneurial firms in these economies 




created to co-opt government agencies into their organizational structure in order to control and 
even manipulate the unfavorable institutional environment. It has empirically evaluated the role 
of one such organizational arrangement – public-private hybrid forms – in China’s gradual 
reform period. Using large scale national survey data from China, it finds that entrepreneurial 
firms adopting these forms enjoy higher entrepreneurial reinvestment rates than pure private 
firms during gradual reform, and that this may be because such forms help to protect private 
property rights and access key resources and opportunities. In addition, it finds that the 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max  median N 
1.reinvest rate 0.62 0.29 0 1 0.65 1434 
2.tax rate 0.06 0.07 0 1 0.05 1495 
3.access to government protection 
of firm rights 
0.64 0.48 0 1 1 1692 
4.access to capital 0.56 0.50 0 1 1 1807 
5.access to sales market 0.01 0.12 0 1 0 1675 
6.access to land 0.45 0.50 0 1 0 1682 
7.access to technology 0.02 0.15 0 1 0 1636 
8.hybrid firm 0.10 0.29 0 1 0 1803 
9.firm size a 6.69 25.93 0 503 1.20 1565 
10.firm age 8.71 5.83 0 47 8 1811 
11.city firm 0.30 0.46 0 1 0 1841 
12.return on sales 0.13 0.18 0 4.50 0.10 1489 
13.female 0.08 0.27 0 1 0 1850 
14.age  39.58 8.67 19 84 39 1827 
15.education 11.39 2.79 0 18 12 1845 
16.party member 0.18 0.39 0 1 0 1854 
17.property rights protection 28.53 7.76 0 45.95 26.24 21 
18.market development 0.24 0.12 0.09 0.70 0.22 21 
19.GDP growth rate 0.11  0.02  0.08 0.15 0.11 21 
20.east coastal provinces 0.19  0.39  0 1 0 21 
21.centrally-administered city 0.09  0.28  0 1 0 21 
 





Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.reinvest rate           
2.tax rate -0.03           
3.access to government 
protection of firm rights 
0.05  0.01          
4.access to capital 0.05  -0.01  0.17         
5.access to sales market -0.01  -0.02  0.03  0.06        
6.access to land 0.06  0.01  0.22  0.27  0.08       
7.access to technology 0.02  -0.04  0.03  0.06  0.22  0.09      
8.hybrid firm 0.04  -0.03  0.04  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.06     
9.firm size a 0.12  -0.23  0.05  0.21  -0.01  0.10  0.00  0.19    
10.firm age -0.01  -0.00 -0.05  0.07  0.01  0.04  0.02  -0.08  0.07   
11.city firm 0.02  0.01  -0.04  -0.10  -0.01  -0.19  -0.03  0.09  0.25  0.01  
12.return on sales -0.06  0.31  0.02  -0.04  0.02  -0.06  -0.02  -0.04  -0.34  -0.01  
13.female 0.00  0.03  -0.01  -0.05  0.00  -0.07  -0.01  0.01  -0.04  -0.09  
14.age  0.01  0.05  -0.03  0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.02  0.06  0.12  
15.education 0.01  -0.01  0.01  -0.00 -0.01  -0.11  0.03  0.08  0.20  -0.12  
16.party member 0.04  0.02  0.03  0.06  0.01  -0.00 0.04  0.05  0.07  -0.01  
17.property rights protection 0.12  -0.01  0.03  -0.07  -0.01  -0.12  -0.04  0.03  0.02  -0.19  
18.market development 0.08  -0.01  -0.02  -0.16  0.03  -0.07  0.01  0.00  0.06  -0.12  
19.GDP growth rate 0.01  -0.03  -0.04  -0.03  0.01  0.12  0.03  -0.02  0.03  0.04  
20.east coastal provinces 0.05  -0.03  09  -0.06  0.00  -0.00 0.01  0.03  0.06  -0.17  
21.centrally-administered city 0.07  0.00  -0.07  -0.12  0.02  -0.12  -0.02  0.01  0.15  -0.01 
Variable 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  
11.city firm           
12. return on sales -0.04           
13.female 0.04  0.02          
14.age  0.03  -0.00 -0.06         
15.education 0.30  -0.05  0.05  -0.20        
16.party member -0.04  -0.06  -0.06  0.12  0.04       
17. property rights protection 0.08  -0.03  0.01  -0.01  0.06  -0.07      
18.market development 0.13  -0.04  0.06  -0.00 0.06  -0.02  0.48     
19.GDP growth rate -0.04  -0.03  -0.11  0.01  -0.06  0.02  -0.05  0.08    
20.east coastal provinces 0.01  -0.09  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.44  0.50  0.24   
21.centrally-administered city 0.31 -0.00 0.02  0.01  0.19  -0.03  0.29  0.69  0.08  0.11  
 
Note: a Firm size is measured as sales income. The unit is 1 million Chinese Yuan.   





Table 3. Means of variables for hybrid firms and pure private firms 
 
Variable Hybrid firms Pure private firms t-statistic 
1.reinvest rate 0.64 0.61 1.50 
2.tax rate 0.05 0.06 1.29 
3.access to government protection 
of firm rights 
0.69 0.63 
1.65* 
4.access to capital 0.68 0.55 3.15*** 
5.access to sales market 0.04 0.01 2.76*** 
6.access to land 0.56 0.44 2.72*** 
7.access to technology 0.05 0.02 2.25** 
8.firm size a 16.41 5.78 4.60*** 
9.firm age 8.71 8.76 0.11 
10.city firm 0.42 0.28 3.71*** 
11.return on sales 0.11 0.14 1.45 
12.female 0.08 0.08 0.21 
13.age  40.30 39.57 1.04 
14.education 12.08 11.30 3.46*** 
15.party member 0.25 0.18 2.23** 
16.property rights protection 29.12 28.42 1.12 
17.market development 0.24 0.24 0.02 
18.GDP growth rate 0.11 0.11 0.66 
19.east coastal provinces 0.23 0.19 1.32 
20.centrally-administered city 0.10 0.09 0.60 
 
Note: a Firm size is measured as sales income. The unit is 1 million Chinese Yuan.  







Table 4. Estimates of hybrid firm for reinvestment rate and tax rate 
 
 
Note: Province-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
 
  
Explanatory variables  Dependent variables 
 Reinvestment rate (logged) Tax rate (logged) 
Hybrid firm - 0.201** -0.192* 
 - (0.096) (0.095) 
Firm size (logged) 0.111*** 0.106*** -0.032 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.027) 
Firm age  -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) 
City firm -0.054 -0.058 0.064 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.063) 
Return on sales -0.083 -0.085 - 
 (0.434) (0.447) - 
Entrepreneur is a female 0.268* 0.262* 0.244*** 
 (0.144) (0.149) (0.082) 
Entrepreneur’s age 0.004 0.004 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Entrepreneur’s education -0.005 -0.006 0.013 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) 
Entrepreneur is a Party 
member 
0.178* 0.172* 0.094 
 (0.089) (0.091) (0.086) 
Industrial dummies (14) added added added 
Province dummies (20)  added added added 
    
Constant -0.860** -0.890 -4.278*** 
 (0.307) (0.542) (0.231) 
    
R2 0.060 0.065 0.092 










Note: Province-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. 









Explanatory  Dependent variables 












Hybrid firm 0.344* 0.503** 1.229** 0.605*** 1.193** 
 (0.199) (0.228) (0.512) (0.197) (0.477) 
Firm size (logged) 0.096* 0.313*** -0.007 0.196*** -0.054 
 (0.060) (0.054) (0.158) (0.048) (0.114) 
Firm age  -0.035 0.010 -0.024 -0.009 0.029 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.042) (0.013) (0.026) 
City firm -0.071 -0.815*** -0.165 -0.477** -0.469 
 (0.232) (0.214) (0.522) (0.200) (0.424) 
Entrepreneur is a 
female 
-0.112 0.119 -0.502 -0.200 0.220 
 (0.246) (0.220) (0.958) (0.316) (0.742) 
Entrepreneur’s age -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.003 0.018 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.032) 
Entrepreneur’s 
education 
0.008 0.009 -0.074 -0.040 0.176* 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.087) (0.038) (0.094) 
Entrepreneur is a 
Party member 
0.041 0.221 0.209 -0.129 0.406 
 (0.163) (0.151) (0.608) (0.203) (0.408) 
Industrial 
dummies (14) 
added added added added added 
Province dummies 
(20)  
added added added added added 
      
Constant -0.162 2.369* -3.971 0.047 -23.419*** 
 (1.630) (1.397) (2.452) (1.247) (2.154) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.132 0.104 0.164 0.126 




Table 6. HLM estimates of hybrid firm as legal and market institutions vary 
 
Note: Province-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
  
Explanatory variables  Reinvestment rate (logged) 
 
Hybrid firm 0.622*** 0.309* 
 (0.000) (0.158) 
Hybrid firm × property rights protection -0.017*** - 
 (0.003) - 
Hybrid firm × market development - -0.805* 
 - (0.425) 
Provincial level controls    
    Property rights protection 0.027** 0.025** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
    Market development 0.699 0.776 
 (1.015) (1.020) 
    GDP growth rate 2.421 2.421 
 (3.461) (3.437) 
    East coastal provinces -0.197 -0.196 
 (0.239) (0.239) 
    Centrally-administered city 0.065 0.067 
 (0.374) (0.372) 
Firm level controls   
    Firm size (logged) 0.112*** 0.111*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
    Firm age  -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
    City firm -0.103 -0.106 
 (0.112) (0.112) 
     Return on sales -0.085 -0.093 
 (0.420) (0.421) 
     Entrepreneur is a female 0.251* 0.256* 
 (0.135) (0.134) 
     Entrepreneur’s age 0.003 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
     Entrepreneur’s education -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
     Entrepreneur is a Party member 0.144* 0.148* 
 (0.088) (0.088) 
    Industrial dummies (14) added added 
    Constant -2.025** -1.984** 
 (0.957) (0.953) 
Firm level random effect  2.538*** 2.538*** 
 (0.479) (0.479) 
Provincial level random effect 0.250 0.250 
 (0.497) (0.510) 
   
Log likelihood -2534.182 -2534.173 
Firm level observations 1351 1351 









Note: OLS = Ordinary Least Squares; LPM = Linear Probability Model. The OLS model is used for 
estimating the effect of hybrid firm on reinvestment rate and tax rate; the LPM, which is the linear 
regression model applied to a binary dependent variable, is used for estimating the effect of hybrid firm 
on the remaining five binary dependent variables. I use LPM in column 1 here instead of the logit model 
as in Table 5 in order to make a fair comparison because estimates from the propensity score matching 
methods are based on the linear regression model. Results from other propensity score matching methods 
are similar as Kernal matching with Gausian.  
       
In parentheses are standard errors.   
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
 
 OLS/LPM regression with all 
covariates  
Kernel matching with Gausian 
with the same set of covariates 


























Access to technology 0.042* 
(0.023) 
0.045* 
(0.023) 
